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Summary 
There is increasing concern about harmful content and activity on social media. This 
includes cyberbullying, the intimidation of public figures, disinformation, material 
promoting violence and self-harm, and age inappropriate content. 
Critics, including parliamentary committees, academics, and children’s charities, have 
argued that self-regulation by social media companies is not enough to keep users safe 
and that statutory regulation should be introduced. 
The Online Harms White Paper – a new regulatory framework?  
An Online Harms White Paper was published in April 2019. This set out the then 
Government's approach for tackling “content or activity that harms individual users, 
particularly children, or threatens our way of life in the UK.”  
According to the White Paper, existing regulatory and voluntary initiatives had “not gone 
far or fast enough” to keep users safe. The Paper proposed a single regulatory framework 
to tackle a range of harms. At its core would be a statutory duty of care for internet 
companies, including social media platforms. An independent regulator would oversee 
and enforce compliance with the duty.   
A consultation on the proposals closed on 1 July 2019. 
Reaction 
The White Paper received a mixed reaction. Children’s charities were positive. The NSPCC 
said that the Paper was a “hugely significant commitment” that could make the UK a 
“world pioneer in protecting children online”.  
However, many commentators raised concerns that harms were insufficiently defined and 
that the Paper blurred the boundary between illegal and harmful content. 
The Open Rights Group and the Index on Censorship have warned that the proposed 
framework poses serious risks to freedom of expression. 
What next? 
The Queen’s Speech of 19 December 2019 says that the Government “will develop 
legislation to improve internet safety for all”. A Background Briefing to the Speech states 
that the Government wants to keep people safe “in a proportionate way, ensuring that 
freedom of expression is upheld and promoted online, and that the value of a free and 
independent press is preserved”. According to the Briefing, the Government is analysing 
responses to the consultation on the Online Harms White Paper. It will then prepare 
legislation to implement its policy decision. 
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1. Background  
The criminal law applies to online activity in the same way as to offline 
activity. As the Government has noted, legislation passed before the 
digital age “has shown itself to be flexible and capable of catching and 
punishing offenders whether their crimes are committed by digital 
means or otherwise”.1 The Crown Prosecution Service has published 
guidance on offences on social media. 
In addition, many regulators have a role in relation to certain types of 
online activity e.g. Ofcom, the Competition and Markets Authority, the 
Advertising Standards Authority, the Information Commissioner’s Office, 
and the Financial Conduct Authority.2  
The internet is therefore not quite an unregulated “Wild West” as some 
have claimed.3  
However, there is no overall regulator and there is no specific content 
regulator.4 Also, under the e-Commerce Directive, social media 
companies are exempt from liability for illegal content they host if they 
“play a neutral, merely technical and passive role” towards it. Once they 
become aware of illegal content, they must remove or disable access to 
it. 
For content that is harmful or inappropriate, but not illegal, social media 
platforms self-regulate i.e. through “community standards” and “terms 
of use” that users agree to when joining a platform. This type of 
material can promote violence, self-harm, or cyberbullying. It can also 
include indecent, disturbing or misleading content.5 The role of social 
media in enabling access to such material, and claims that self-
regulation is an unsatisfactory response, has led to calls for statutory 
regulation and for the e-Commerce Directive to be revised or replaced.  
1.1 Social media companies – increased 
liability? 
The e-Commerce Directive makes provision about the liability of 
“information society services”, a category that includes most internet 
service providers and online platforms.6 
The Directive provides exemptions to liability for three types of online 
services - those that host (Article 14), cache (Article 13) or transmit 
(Article 12) content under certain circumstances.  
                                                                                             
1  HMG, Internet Safety Strategy - Green paper, October 2017, p37 
2  House of Lords Select Committee on Communications, Regulating in a digital world 
HL Paper 299, March 2019, Appendix 4 
3  House of Lords Select Committee on Communications, Regulating in a digital world, 
p9; Science and Technology Committee, Impact of social media and screen-use on 
young people’s health, HC 822, January 2019, p52  
4  House of Lords Select Committee on Communications, Regulating in a digital world, 
p3 
5  Ibid, p48 
6  Directive 2000/31/EC; In the UK, the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 
2002 implemented the Directive 
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Social media companies are generally regarded as information society 
services that host material, rather than create it. Under Article 14, they 
are not liable for content that they host, provided they do not have 
actual knowledge of illegal activity and act expeditiously to remove the 
information if they are informed that it is illegal.7 Only services that 
“play a neutral, merely technical and passive role towards the hosted 
content are covered by the exemption”.8 This model of liability is 
commonly called the “notice and take-down” model.9  
Under Article 15, Member States must not impose a general obligation   
on internet intermediaries to monitor or actively to seek facts or 
circumstances indicating illegal activity. 
Criticism 
The liability framework under the e-Commerce Directive has been 
criticised by different parliamentary committees. A March 2019 report 
by the Lords Select Committee on Communications noted that the 
Directive was nearly twenty years old and was developed before 
platforms began to curate content for users. It concluded, among other 
things, that notice and take-down was “not an adequate model for 
content regulation”.10 
In a July 2018 report, the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee 
argued that social media companies could not “hide behind the claim of 
being merely a ‘platform’” with no role in regulating the content of 
their sites”: 
…they continually change what is and is not seen on their sites, 
based on algorithms and human intervention…11 
A December 2017 report by the Committee on Standards in Public Life 
said that the Government should consider legislation to “rebalance” 
liability for online content after the UK had left the EU.12 
The application of the Directive to online platforms has its defenders. An 
October 2017 paper, produced for the European Parliament’s Internal 
Market and Consumer Protection Committee, argued that the current 
framework should be “maintained, since it is needed to ensure the 
                                                                                             
7  For discussion of the Directive see: House of Lords Select Committee on 
Communications, Regulating in a digital world, chapter 5; Lorna Woods, “When is 
Facebook liable for illegal content under the E-commerce Directive?”, EU law 
analysis blog, 19 January 2017; Giovanni Sartor, Providers Liability: From the 
eCommerce Directive to the future, Report requested by the European Parliament’s 
Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee, October 2017 
8  European Commission website, e-Commerce Directive [accessed 10 December 2019] 
9  House of Lords Select Committee on Communications, Regulating in a digital world, 
chapter 5; Lorna Woods, “When is Facebook liable for illegal content under the E-
commerce Directive?”, EU law analysis blog, 19 January 2017 
10  House of Lords Select Committee on Communications, Regulating in a digital world, 
p5 and para 193 
11  Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Disinformation and ‘fake news’: 
Interim Report, HC 363 2017-19, July 2018, para 57 
12  Committee on Standards in Public Life, Intimidation in Public Life: A Review, 
Cm 9543, December 2017, pp35-7  
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diverse provision of intermediation services and the freedoms of the 
users of such services”.13 
Graham Smith, an internet lawyer, has defended Article 15 of the 
Directive and its role in protecting freedom of expression:  
(…) [Article 15] prevents the state from turning internet gateways 
into checkpoints at which the flow of information could be 
filtered, controlled and blocked. 
 
The principle embodied in Article 15 is currently under pressure: 
from policymakers within and outside Brussels, from antagonistic 
business sectors, from the security establishment and potentially 
from all manner of speech prohibitionists. The common theme is 
that online intermediaries – ISPs, telecommunications operators, 
social media platforms - are gatekeepers who can and should be 
pressed into active service of the protagonists’ various causes.  
 
Article 15 stands in the way of the blunt instrument of 
compulsory general monitoring and filtering. It does so not for the 
benefit of commercial platforms and ISPs, but to fulfil the policy 
aim of protecting the free flow of information and ultimately the 
freedom of speech of internet users…14 
1.2 Social media companies - a duty of care? 
The e-Commerce Directive does not prevent Member States from 
requiring service providers to apply duties of care “which can reasonably 
be expected from them and which are specified by national law, in 
order to detect and prevent certain types of illegal activities”.15 
Lorna Woods (Professor of Internet Law at the University of Essex) and 
William Perrin (Trustee of Carnegie UK Trust) have proposed a 
regulatory regime, centred on a new statutory duty of care, to reduce 
online harm. The regime, developed under the “aegis” of the Carnegie 
UK Trust, was put forward in a series of blog posts in 2018. A “refined” 
proposal was published in January 2019.16 Woods and Perrin explain the 
duty as follows: 
Social media service providers should each be seen as responsible 
for a public space they have created, much as property owners or 
operators are in the physical world. Everything that happens on a 
social media service is a result of corporate decisions: about the 
terms of service, the software deployed and the resources put into 
enforcing the terms of service. 
In the physical world, Parliament has long imposed statutory 
duties of care upon property owners or occupiers in respect of 
people using their places, as well as on employers in respect of 
their employees. Variants of duties of care also exist in other 
sectors where harm can occur to users or the public. A statutory 
duty of care is simple, broadly based and largely future-proof.  For 
instance, the duties of care in the 1974 Health and Safety at Work 
                                                                                             
13  Giovanni Sartor, Providers Liability: From the eCommerce Directive to the future, 
Report requested by the European Parliament’s Internal Market and Consumer 
Protection Committee, October 2017, Abstract and Executive summary 
14  Graham Smith, “Time to speak up for Article 15”, Cyberlegal Blog, 21 May 2017 
15  Recital 48 of Directive 2000/31/EC 
16  Lorna Woods and William Perrin, Internet harm reduction: an updated proposal, 
Carnegie UK Trust, Janaury 2019 
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Act still work well today, enforced and with their application kept 
up to date by a competent regulator. A statutory duty of care 
focuses on the objective – harm reduction – and leaves the detail 
of the means to those best placed to come up with solutions in 
context: the companies who are subject to the duty of care.  A 
statutory duty of care returns the cost of harms to those 
responsible for them, an application of the micro-economically 
efficient ‘polluter pays’ principle… 
Parliament should guide the regulator with a non-exclusive list of 
harms for it to focus upon. These should be: the stirring up 
offences including misogyny, harassment, economic harm, 
emotional harm, harms to national security, to the judicial process 
and to democracy...17 
The regime would regulate services that: 
• have a strong two-way or multiway communications 
component; 
• display user-generated content publicly or to a large 
member/user audience or group. 
It would cover “reasonably foreseeable harm that occurs to people who 
are users of a service and reasonably foreseeable harm to people who 
are not users of a service”.18 
Woods and Perrin argue that the regulator should be an existing one 
with experience of dealing with global companies (they suggest Ofcom). 
The regulator would use a harm reduction method, similar to that used 
for reducing pollution: 
[The regulator would] agree tests for harm, run the tests, the 
company responsible for harm invests to reduce the tested level, 
test again to see if investment has worked and repeat if necessary. 
If the level of harm does not fall or if a company does not co-
operate then the regulator will have sanctions.  
In a model process, the regulator would work with civil society, 
users, victims and the companies to determine the tests and 
discuss both companies harm reduction plans and their outcomes. 
The regulator would have the power to request information from 
regulated companies as well as having its own research 
function.  The nature of fast-moving online services is such that 
the regulator should deploy the UK government’s formalised 
version of the precautionary principle, acting on emerging 
evidence rather than waiting years for full scientific certainty 
about services that have long since stopped…19 
To make companies change their behaviour, Woods and Perrin suggest 
penalties of large fines, set as a proportion of turnover.20 
Criticism 
The duty of care proposed by Woods and Perrin has attracted criticism. 
Graham Smith, for example, has challenged the idea that social media 
                                                                                             
17  Lorna Woods and William Perrin, “Internet Harm Reduction: a Proposal”, Carnegie 
UK Trust Blog, 30 January 2019 
18  Ibid 
19  Ibid 
20  Penalties are issued on a similar basis under the General Data Protection Regulation 
and under the Competition Act 
8 Social media: how much regulation is needed? 
platforms should be viewed as having responsibilities for a public space, 
similar to property owners in the physical world: 
(…) The relationship between a social media platform and its 
users has some parallels with that between the occupier of a 
physical space and its visitors. 
A physical public place is not, however, a perfect analogy. Duties 
of care owed by physical occupiers relate to what is done, not 
said, on their premises. They concern personal injury and damage 
to property. Such safety-related duties of care are thus about 
those aspects of physical public spaces that are less like online 
platforms. 
That is not to say that there is no overlap. Some harms that result 
from online interaction can be fairly described as safety-related. 
Grooming is an obvious example. However that is not the case for 
all kinds of harm…21 
He also raised concerns about the possible impact of the duty on 
freedom of expression: 
(…) We derive from the right of freedom of speech a set of 
principles that collide with the kind of actions that duties of care 
might require, such as monitoring and pre-emptive removal of 
content. The precautionary principle may have a place in 
preventing harm such as pollution, but when applied to speech it 
translates directly into prior restraint. The presumption against 
prior restraint refers not just to pre-publication censorship, but the 
principle that speech should stay available to the public until the 
merits of a complaint have been adjudicated by a legally 
competent independent tribunal.  The fact that we are dealing 
with the internet does not negate the value of procedural 
protections for speech…22 
Support 
A February 2019 NSPCC report drew heavily on the work of Woods and 
Perrin and argued for a regulator to enforce a duty of care to protect 
children on social media.23 According to the NSPCC, 90% of parents 
support making social networks legally responsible for protecting 
children.24 
In a January 2109 report, the Science and Technology Committee noted 
the work of Woods and Perrin25 and recommended, among others, that 
a duty of care should be introduced that would require social media 
companies “to act with reasonable care to avoid identified harms” to 
users aged under 18.26 The duty would extend beyond that age for 
other vulnerable groups, as determined by the Government. 
                                                                                             
21  Graham Smith, “Take care with that social media duty of care”, Cyberlegal Blog, 
19 October 2018  
22  Ibid 
23  NSPCC, Taming the Wild West Web: How to regulate social networks and keep 
children safe from abuse, February 2019, p1 and chapter 3 
24  “9 out of 10 parents back social network regulation”, NSPCC News, 
12 February 2019 
25  House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, Impact of social media and 
screen-use on young people’s health, paras 223-5 
26  Ibid, para 228 
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Woods and Perrin submitted evidence to the Lords Select Committee on 
Communications during its inquiry into regulating the digital world.27 
The Committee’s March 2019 report recommended that a duty of care 
should be imposed on online services hosting user-generated content. 
This would be enforced by Ofcom.28 
In April 2019, after consulting on its internet safety strategy, the 
Government’s Online Harms White Paper set out plans to introduce a 
statutory duty of care, to be overseen by an independent regulator.29 
1.3 The Internet Safety Strategy 
In October 2017, as part of its Digital Charter work, the Government 
published an Internet Safety Strategy green paper to help make “Britain 
the safest place in the world to be online.”30 Among other things, the 
paper looked at the role of social media companies in keeping users 
safe and sought views on a social media code of practice - section 103 
of the Digital Economy Act 2017 requires the Government to publish a 
voluntary code for social media platforms. The code would introduce 
minimum standards and ensure regular review and monitoring. The 
code has to address conduct that involves bullying, insulting, 
intimidating or humiliating behaviour. A consultation on the proposals 
closed in December 2017.  
Government response 
The Government’s response was published in May 2018. This noted that 
a growing number of people, including parents and education and 
health professionals, were concerned about safety online. The 
consultation highlighted three main issues: 
• Online behaviours too often fail to meet acceptable standards; 
• Users can feel powerless to address these issues; 
• Technology companies can operate without proper oversight, 
transparency or accountability, and commercial interests mean 
that they can fail to act in users’ best interests.31 
Various charities, including those representing children,32 expressed 
concern about the existing self-regulatory approach and suggested 
making the social media code of practice legally binding, with an 
independent regulator and sanctions regime. However, the Internet 
Watch Foundation noted that self-regulation, in partnership with the 
internet industry, was “hugely effective” in removing online child abuse 
images. The industry companies that responded to the consultation also 
favoured continued self-regulation.33  
The Government’s view was that the “disconnect” between user and 
industry responses strongly suggested that companies needed to do 
                                                                                             
27  See House of Lords Select Committee on Communications, Regulating in a digital 
world, paras 198-202 
28  Ibid, paras 205-6 
29  HMG, Online Harms White Paper, April 2019 
30  HMG, Internet Safety Strategy - Green paper, October 2017, p3 
31  HMG, Response to the Internet Safety Strategy Green Paper, May 2018, p5 
32  e.g. the NSPCC and the Children’s Charities’ Coalition on Internet Safety 
33  Response to the Internet Safety Strategy Green Paper, May 2018, p9 
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more to manage content and behaviour on their platforms.34 A white 
paper would be published, setting out areas for legislation, including 
making the social media code of practice legally binding.35 The white 
paper would also look at increasing the liability of social media 
platforms for harmful and illegal content. The Government’s response 
to the consultation claimed that the status quo was “increasingly 
unsustainable as it becomes clear many platforms are no longer just 
passive hosts.”36  
 
                                                                                             
34  Ibid, p13 
35  Ibid, p15 
36  Ibid, p14 
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2. The Online Harms White Paper 
The Online Harms White Paper was published in April 2019. It set out 
the then Government’s approach to “tackle content or activity that 
harms individual users, particularly children, or threatens our way of 
life.”37  
According to the Government, the current “patchwork of regulation 
and voluntary initiatives” had not gone far or fast enough to keep UK 
users safe. The Paper therefore proposed a single regulatory framework 
to tackle a range of online harms.38 The core of this would be a new 
statutory duty of care for internet companies, including social media 
platforms. An independent regulator would oversee and enforce 
compliance with the duty.  
The Paper covered three categories of harms: 
• harms with a clear definition; 
• harms with a less clear definition; 
• underage exposure to legal content. 
Examples of harms in each category were set out in the following 
table:39 
 
 
Part 1 of the White Paper gives further detail on the above harms.  
 
                                                                                             
37  HM Government, Online Harms White Paper, April 2019, p6 
38  p30 
39  p31 
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The regulatory model 
Parts 2 and 3 of the Paper set out in detail the Government’s plans for a 
new regulatory framework. A brief overview of some of the key 
elements is set out below. 
What would the duty require? 
The statutory duty of care would require companies to take greater 
responsibility for the safety of their users and to tackle the harms caused 
by content or activity on their services.  
The regulator would issue codes of practice setting out how to do this. 
For terrorist activity or child sexual exploitation and abuse (CSEA), the 
Home Secretary would sign off the codes. 
As an indication of fulfilling the duty of care, companies would be 
expected to: 
• ensure their relevant terms and conditions meet standards set by 
the regulator and reflect the codes of practice as appropriate. 
• enforce their own relevant terms and conditions effectively and 
consistently. 
• prevent known terrorist or CSEA content being made available 
to users.  
• take prompt, transparent and effective action following user 
reporting. 
• support law enforcement investigations to bring criminals who 
break the law online to justice. 
• direct users who have suffered harm to support. 
• regularly review their efforts in tackling harm and adapt their 
internal processes to drive continuous improvement.40 
To help with the above outcomes, codes of practice would include: 
• steps to ensure products and services are safe by design. 
• guidance about how to ensure terms of use are adequate and 
are understood by users when they sign up to use the service. 
• measures to ensure that reporting processes and processes for 
moderating content and activity are transparent and effective. 
• steps to ensure harmful content or activity is dealt with rapidly. 
• processes that allow users to appeal the removal of content or 
other responses, in order to protect users’ rights online.  
• steps to ensure that users who have experienced harm are 
directed to, and receive, adequate support. 
• steps to monitor, evaluate and improve the effectiveness of their 
processes.41 
Section 7 of the Paper sets out specific areas that codes of practice 
would be expected to cover in relation to the following types of harm: 
                                                                                             
40  p64 
41  pp64-5 
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CSEA, terrorism, serious violence, hate crime, harassment, 
disinformation, encouraging self-harm and suicide, the abuse of public 
figures, cyberbullying, and children accessing inappropriate content. 
Who would the duty apply to? 
The White Paper noted that harmful content and behaviour originates 
from a wide range of online platforms or services and that these cannot 
easily be categorised by reference to a single business model or sector. It 
therefore focused on the services provided by companies. According to 
the Paper, there are two main types of online activity that can give rise 
to the online harms in scope: 
• hosting, sharing and discovery of user-generated content (e.g. a 
post on a public forum or the sharing of a video); 
• facilitation of public and private online interaction between 
service users (e.g. instant messaging or comments on posts). 
As a wide variety of companies and organisations provide the above 
services, the regulatory framework would cover social media companies, 
public discussion forums, retailers that allow users to review products 
online, non-profit organisations, file sharing sites and cloud hosting 
providers.42 
The Paper said that users should be protected from harmful behaviour 
and content in private as well as public online space. Given the 
importance of privacy, the framework would “ensure a differentiated 
approach for private communication”. The Paper sought views on how 
‘private’ and ‘public’ should be defined as well on what regulatory 
requirements should apply to private communication services.43 
The regulator 
An independent regulator would oversee and enforce the new 
framework. It would issue codes of practice, setting out what 
companies would need to do to comply with the duty of care. The 
regulator’s other functions would include: 
• establishing a framework to assess compliance with the duty of 
care; 
• overseeing the implementation of user redress mechanisms; 
• promoting education about online safety for users; 
• taking enforcement action against non-compliant companies; 
• promoting the development and adoption of safety technologies 
to tackle online harms; 
• undertaking and commissioning research on online harms and 
their impact.44 
                                                                                             
42  p49 
43  p50 
44  p54 
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The regulator’s initial focus would be on companies posing the “biggest 
and most obvious risk” to users, either because of the size of a service, 
or because of known harms.45 
Companies would be required to do what is “reasonably practicable" to 
meet regulatory requirements. This would be enshrined in legislation.46 
The Paper sought views on whether the regulator should be a new or 
an existing body with an extended remit.47  
Enforcement 
The core enforcement powers of the regulator would be: 
• Issuing civil fines for proven failures in clearly defined 
circumstances. Civil fines can be tied into metrics such as annual 
turnover, volume of illegal material, volume of views of illegal 
material, and time taken to respond to the regulator. 
• Serving a notice to a company that is alleged to have breached 
standards, and setting a timeframe to respond with an action plan 
to rectify the issue. 
• Requiring additional information from the company regarding 
the alleged breach. 
• Publishing public notices about the proven failure of the 
company to comply with standards.48 
The powers would be used in a proportionate manner, “taking the 
impact on the economy into account”.49 
The paper sought views on other possible powers for the regulator: 
• disruption of business activities in the event of extremely serious 
breaches – e.g. a company failing to take action to stop terrorist 
use of its services; 
• internet service provider (ISP) blocking – an option of “last 
resort” where a company had “committed serious, repeated and 
egregious violations of the outcome requirements for illegal 
harms, failing to maintain basic standards after repeated 
warnings and notices of improvement”; 
• senior management liability – holding certain individuals  
personally accountable in the event of a major breach of the 
duty of care. This could involve personal liability for civil fines, or 
could even extend to criminal liability.50  
Why did the Paper not seek changes to liability? 
In the White Paper, the Government explained why it was not seeking 
changes to the liability regime under the e-Commerce Directive: 
                                                                                             
45  p54 
46  p55 
47  pp57-8 
48  pp59-60 
49  p59 
50  p60 
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The existing liability regime…does not provide a mechanism to 
ensure proactive action to identify and remove content. In 
addition, even if reforms to the liability regime successfully 
addressed the problem of illegal content, they would not address 
the full range of harmful activity or harmful behaviour in scope. 
More fundamentally, the focus on liability for the presence of 
illegal content does not incentivise the systemic improvements in 
governance and risk management processes that we think are 
necessary… 
According to the Government, its proposed framework would take a 
more thorough approach: 
(…) It will increase the responsibility that services have in relation 
to online harms, in line with the existing law that enables 
platforms to operate. In particular, companies will be required to 
ensure that they have effective and proportionate processes and 
governance in place to reduce the risk of illegal and harmful 
activity on their platforms, as well as to take appropriate and 
proportionate action when issues arise. The new regulatory 
regime will also ensure effective oversight of the take-down of 
illegal content, and will introduce specific monitoring 
requirements for tightly defined categories of illegal content.51 
Consultation 
A consultation on the Paper’s proposals closed on 1 July 2019. The 
Government is still analysing the responses (see section 3 below).  
2.1 Comment 
The White Paper received a mixed response.  
Children’s charities 
The NSPCC was positive. Chief Executive, Peter Wanless, said that the 
Paper represented a “hugely significant commitment” that could make 
the UK a “world pioneer in protecting children online”: 
…For too long social networks have failed to prioritise children’s 
safety and left them exposed to grooming, abuse, and harmful 
content. So it’s high time they were forced to act through this 
legally binding duty to protect children, backed up with hefty 
punishments if they fail to do so….52 
The Children's Charities' Coalition on Internet Safety (CHIS) 
“applaud[ed]” the Paper: 
(…) It recognises self-regulation has failed as the core principle for 
addressing the challenges facing children as internet users. It sees 
a statutory Regulator as an essential feature of the future 
landscape. As a statement of intent, the White Paper’s aspirations 
are crystal clear, and the Government is doubly to be commended 
for publishing it, written as it was in the face of nearly zero 
meaningful co-operation from a great many important high-tech 
companies.53 
                                                                                             
51  pp62-3 
52  “Government listens to our Wild West Web campaign and launches White Paper”, 
NSPCC News, 8 April 2019 
53  CHIS, Comments on the Online Harms White Paper, July 2019, p1 
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Anne Longfield, the Children’s Commissioner for England, said that the 
problem of harmful content on social media was getting worse, that 
self-regulation had to end, and that the Government’s plans for a 
statutory duty of care “cannot come a moment too soon”. She called 
for the new regulator to “have teeth with strong powers to represent 
children” and for the balance of power to “to decisively shift” away 
from the companies.54 
Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee 
In a June 2019 report, the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee 
said it was “pleased” that its recommendations55 for a duty of care, 
overseen by an independent regulator, had been included in the White 
Paper.56 The Committee said that the regulator’s success would depend 
on its enforcement powers: 
(…) We urge the Government to take an ambitious approach to 
equipping the regulator with sufficient means, including adequate 
sanctions. This must go beyond fines to include the ability to 
disrupt the activities of businesses that are not complying, and 
ultimately custodial sentences…57 
Most of the Committee’s report discussed the White Paper’s “scant 
focus on electoral interference and online political advertising”, both of 
which the Committee had said required “urgent action.”58   
Carnegie UK Trust 
In a June 2019 summary response, Lorna Woods, William Perrin and 
Maeve Walsh said that the White Paper was a “significant step in 
attempts to improve the online environment”. However, a number of 
concerns were raised. 
The response noted that the White Paper envisaged online operators 
moderating and taking proactive action in relation to certain forms of 
content. Although the Paper acknowledged that the e-Commerce 
Directive prohibits general monitoring, Woods et al claimed that its 
explanation of how it resolved this conflict was “weak”. 
The Trust said that it could not support the Government drafting some 
of the codes of practice, even in relation to the most extreme and 
harmful speech. According to the Trust, the drafting should, at most, be 
the responsibility of Parliament or, “more likely”, the independent 
regulator after consultation with bodies such as the police, the security 
services, the Crown Prosecution Service and possibly the Home 
Secretary. 
The White Paper did not identify an existing body, such as Ofcom, to be 
the regulator. The Trust said this was a “significant weakness”. Ofcom 
had a proven track record of effective engagement with some of the 
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largest media groups, whereas a new body would take “years to earn 
sufficient reputation to be taken seriously”.  
The Trust said that the Paper’s distinction between clearly defined and 
less clearly defined harms was “not helpful”. It was also a mistake to 
exclude economic harm from the framework’s scope. In addition, there 
was no mention of making misogyny a hate crime, despite the 
Government committing to do so. 
Without “urgent clarification” of the points it had raised, the Trust 
claimed that the Government had “opened itself up to (legitimate) 
criticism” that its proposed regime was “about moderation, censorship 
and takedown”. 
A full response, including the Trust’s responses to the White Paper’s 
questions, was published in June 2019. 
Further criticism of the framework 
Other commentators have drawn attention to the White Paper’s 
“extremely broad” definition of “online harms”, that it treats legal and 
illegal harms as “indistinguishable”, risks conflating legal and social 
issues, and could restrict freedom of expression.59 
The concept of “harm” 
Paul Wragg, Editor in Chief of Communications Law, noted that the 
Paper “moves, awkwardly and confusingly, between criminality and 
immorality, between commerce and health and safety, between social 
cohesion and personal development”. This is not a “description of a 
problem, or even some problems. It is a description of all our 
problems”.60 Wragg claimed there was a tension throughout the Paper 
between questions of law and ethics, between what is illegal and what 
is unacceptable. According to Wragg, freedom of expression becomes 
the “obvious casualty” when attempting to prevent harm to internet 
users. 
Graham Smith criticised the Paper’s “all-encompassing” approach: 
[The White Paper] sets out to forge a single sword of truth and 
righteousness with which to assail all manner of online content 
from terrorist propaganda to offensive material. 
However, flying a virtuous banner is no guarantee that the army is 
marching in the right direction. Nor does it preclude the possibility 
that specialised units would be more effective… 
(…) An aversion to fragmentation is like saying that instead of the 
framework of criminal offences and civil liability, focused on 
specific kinds of conduct, that make up our mosaic of offline laws 
we should have a single offence of Behaving Badly. 
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We could not contemplate such a universal offence with 
equanimity. A Law against Behaving Badly would be so open to 
subjective and arbitrary interpretation as to be the opposite of 
law: rule by ad hoc command. Assuredly it would fail to satisfy the 
rule of law requirement of reasonable certainty. By the same 
token we should treat with suspicion anything that smacks of a 
universal Law against Behaving Badly Online. 
In placing an undefined and unbounded notion of harm at the 
centre of its proposals for a universal duty of care, the 
government has set off down that path. 
Smith goes on to discuss how the Paper’s “impermissibly vague” 
concept of harm, including the “nebulous” notion of “harm to society”, 
could cause problems for legislation, hand too much power to the 
regulator, and restrict freedom of expression.61 
Freedom of expression 
Organisations working to protect freedom of expression have raised 
concerns about the White Paper. 
Open Rights Group 
In a May 2019 paper, the Open Rights Group (ORG) noted that “the 
Internet in general and social media in particular play a central role in 
protecting free expression in society. They have particular importance 
for children and young people’s expression and access to 
information”.62 
According to ORG, the Government’s proposed framework was 
“unrealistically vast” and a “poor” conceptual approach.63 In ORG’s 
view, any regulatory scheme should be “explicitly rooted in the 
international human rights framework”: 
• (…) This provides an established, universally-applicable standard 
capable of holding both companies and States to account. 
• Regulation should encourage internet companies to adopt and 
implement the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights . These establish principles of due diligence, transparency, 
accountability and remediation, and would commit companies to 
implementing human rights standards throughout their product 
and policy operations. We would welcome incorporation of 
these principles into any regulatory framework so that they 
become directly enforceable. 
• It is critical to acknowledge and understand that 
regulation will ultimately bite on social media users and 
directly impact the fundamental rights of ordinary citizens. 
Regulating social media is essentially different from regulating 
newspapers or broadcasters because internet media platforms 
driven by user generated content facilitate the day-to-day 
freedom of expression of their users. 
• Protection of the right to free speech must infuse how 
legislative and regulatory schemes are developed, 
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implemented and enforced. If a harms-based approach is used 
(which we would not recommend), harms to freedom of 
expression must themselves be recognised as a harm, to be 
weighed in any balancing exercise. 
• What is legal offline must remain legal online. 
• Platforms must not be obligated to generally scan or 
monitor content. Proactive monitoring is inconsistent with the 
right to privacy and will lead to increased censorship. 
• Regulation should promote non-discrimination in decision-
making, both human and algorithmic.64 
ORG also noted the importance of any policy intervention being 
underpinned “with a clear, objective evidence base which demonstrates 
that actions are necessary and proportionate”: 
Regulation impacting on citizen’s free speech needs to be based 
on evidence of harm traceable to specific pieces or types of 
content, activity or behaviour, rather than expectations or social 
judgements that these may be related to possible harms... 
There were limitations of research in this area that had to be taken into 
account when assessing the weight to be given to evidence: 
Risk encounters cannot easily be measured except by asking 
children directly, which raises ethical (children might be unaware 
of harm until asked specifically) and measurement (risk of under- 
or over-reporting) questions. Research is also not able to predict 
which children will experience harm as a result of encountering 
risk. Risk refers to the probability of harm, and e.g. encountering 
hostile messages or pornographic images is not necessarily 
harmful. Some risks may also be rare but severe in their 
consequences, and this, too, is difficult to assess. Since children 
are no more homogeneous than the adult population, a host of 
factors affect the distribution of risk and harm, vulnerability and 
resilience.65 
ORG’s response to the White Paper was published in July 2019. 
Index on Censorship 
The Index on Censorship has warned that the White Paper poses 
“serious risks to freedom of expression online”: 
These risks could put the United Kingdom in breach of its 
obligations to respect and promote the right to freedom of 
expression and information as set out in Article 19 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 10 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, amongst other 
international treaties. 
Social media platforms are a key means for tens of millions of 
individuals in the United Kingdom to search for, receive, share and 
impart information, ideas and opinions. The scope of the right to 
freedom of expression includes speech which may be offensive, 
shocking or disturbing. The proposed responses for tackling online 
safety may lead to disproportionate amounts of legal speech 
being curtailed, undermining the right to freedom of expression.66 
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In a June 2019 paper, Index made these recommendations: 
• Parliament must be fully involved in shaping the government’s 
proposals for online regulation as the proposals have the potential 
to cause large-scale impacts on freedom of expression and other 
rights. 
• The proposed duty of care needs to be limited and defined in a 
way that addresses the risk that it will create a strong incentive for 
companies and others to censor legal content, especially if 
combined with fines and personal liability for senior managers. 
• It is important to widen the focus from harms and what 
individual users do online to the structural and systemic issues in 
the architecture of the online world. For example, much greater 
transparency is needed about how algorithms influence what a 
user sees. 
• The government is aiming to work with other countries to build 
international consensus behind the proposals in the white paper. 
This makes it particularly important that the UK’s plans for online 
regulation meet international human rights standards. Parliament 
should ensure that the proposals are scrutinised for compatibility 
with the UK’s international obligations. 
• More scrutiny is needed regarding the implications of the 
proposals for media freedom, as “harmful” news stories risk 
being caught.67 
Proportionality 
Other commentators have pointed out that attempts to prevent online 
harm must be proportionate to the risks. Emma Goodman, for example, 
has written: “While it is true that the most vulnerable need most 
protection, how to sufficiently protect them without over-protecting the 
less vulnerable is also a challenge”.68 
In a May 2019 blog, Ashley Hurst argued that the Government “should 
scale back its ambition to focus on what is illegal and defined, not legal 
and vague”. According to Hurst, the way forward should be focussed 
on technology and education, approaches that are mentioned in the 
White Paper, but not in sufficient detail.69 
A differentiated duty of care? 
In a June 2019 paper, Damian Tambini, Associate Professor in the 
Department of Media and Communications at LSE, acknowledged some 
of the criticisms of the White Paper. He said that its proposed 
framework could be “significantly damaging for freedom of expression 
and pluralism”. On the other hand, it could be “a proportionate and 
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effective response” to internet harms. Much would depend on what 
decisions were taken at the next stage of policy development.70  
Tambini agreed that social media companies have a duty of care to 
protect users from online harms. He also agreed that there should be a 
regulator (Ofweb). However, harms were “insufficiently defined” in the 
White Paper and there was “a blurring of the boundary between illegal 
and harmful content”. In addition, there was a risk of “significant 
chilling of freedom of expression”.71 
According to Tambini, many of the problems with the Paper’s approach 
could be addressed by “a clear distinction between the illegal/clearly 
defined and the legal/less clearly defined categories of content”.72 He 
argued: 
(…) There is a need for a single regulator in order to centralize 
information, transparency, research, and expertise in one 
organization. However, the legal and constitutional basis of 
regulation of illegal content and legal content are distinct and 
should remain distinct, otherwise there is a risk of chilling of free 
speech, regulatory uncertainty, and a failure of the regulatory 
model. The new regulator should work closely with industry to 
create a new code on illegal online harms. For the category of 
legal/‘difficult to define’ content, the regulator should provide 
research, transparency, good practice, and oversight of a plurality 
of self-regulatory codes, and work to promote good practice in 
self-regulation.73 
The central challenge would be to clarify the process of writing 
codes of conduct and adjudicating on their application. 
Tambini explained how a “differentiated” duty of care would work: 
For illegal content requiring urgent action to be removed or 
blocked, such as terrorism, child abuse, and hate speech that 
meets the legal threshold of incitement, an increased pressure to 
enforce should be ensured by a regulator through a code of 
conduct that clearly sets out the standards and expectations 
regarding procedures for removing or blocking content and other 
relevant responsibilities. These categories of harm are such that 
they may justify some form of prior restraint, and where the 
urgency of content removal by platform providers would justify 
effective deterrent sanctions for their failure effectively to do so. A 
code would ensure that this process is transparent and standards 
are supported by Parliament.  
For legal but harmful content: 
Ofweb should promote best practice and provide guidance to 
improve self-regulation, and promote, through monitoring of self-
regulation, improved consumer awareness, and competitive 
pressure for a culture of responsibility. This category of content 
includes political speech and other sensitive areas where prior 
restraint would traditionally be regarded as highly undesirable, 
and where too great a deterrent effect on speech would be 
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socially undesirable. State control of this type of content would 
too easily tip the balance toward censorship and the restriction of 
free speech.  
Both categories of content would be part of the regulator’s remit, but 
the regulator would adopt a ‘one country two systems’ approach and 
not confuse the distinction between illegal and harmful content.74 
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3. What next? 
The Queen’s Speech of 19 December 2019 says that the Government 
“will develop legislation to improve internet safety for all”. A 
Background Briefing to the Speech states that the Government wants to 
keep people safe “in a proportionate way, ensuring that freedom of 
expression is upheld and promoted online, and that the value of a free 
and independent press is preserved”. According to the Briefing, the 
Government is analysing responses to the consultation on the Online 
Harms White Paper. It will then prepare legislation to implement its 
policy decision.75 
In the meantime, the Briefing says that it will publish interim codes of 
practice on tackling the use of the internet by terrorists and those 
engaged in child sexual abuse and exploitation.76 
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